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SCHOLASTIC NATURAL LAW-
PROFESSOR GOBLE'S
DILEMMA *
WILLIAM J. KENEALY, S.J.
P ROFESSOR GEORGE W. GOBLE wrote a challenging and significant
article, entitled Nature, Man and Law: The True Natural Law,'
which was criticised by the present writer's Whose Natural Law?2 To
this criticism Professor Goble has replied in his The Dilemma of the
Natural Law.3 The dilemma indicated in the title is expressed in the
following words:
The universality and immutability of principles of law can either be
determined by objective evidence or they cannot. If they can be so
determined, the whole body of natural law becomes a system of em-
pirical law. If they cannot be so determined, then objective evidence
cannot be used to show the validity of one system over another claim-
ing the same attributes. This is the dilemma of the natural law.4 (Italics
supplied.)
The gist of my reply to this dilemma is that, conceding the second
horn, I deny the first. The reason why I deny the first horn of the
dilemma is because it assumes that objective evidence is confined solely
to empirical data. It implies that we can have objective evidence only of
physical facts adduced by the senses; and that we cannot have objective
evidence of metaphysical truths perceived by the intellect. Since the
physical sciences themselves depend upon the validity of certain meta-
physical truths, Professor Goble's dilemma seems to be predicated upon
*Reprinted from 3 CATHOLIC LAWYER 22 (January, 1957).
1 Goble, 41 A.B.A.J. 403 (1955).
2 Kenealy, I CATHOLIC LAWYER 259 (Oct. 1955).
3 Goble, 2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 226 (July 1956).
4 Id. at 232.
SCHOLASTIC NATURAL LAw-Professor Goble's Dilemma
a truncated scientism. Such an assumption
is essentially inadequate, not merely for
the philosophical and legal sciences, but
also for the positive and physical sciences.
I shall attempt to clarify the above analysis
of Professor Goble's dilemma by the fol-
lowing commentary upon his reply to my
criticism.
The substance of my criticism of Pro-
fessor Goble's original thesis was stated in
the following topical sentences:
Professor Goble sets up and rejects a con-
cept of natural law which would also be
repudiated by every classicist from Thomas
Aquinas to Heinrich Rommen. By "classi-
cists" I mean the scholars and spokesmen
of the traditional natural law philosophy
as expounded by the medieval scholastics
and the modern neo-scholastics. The con-
cept rejected by Professor Goble differs
essentially from the classical concept in
two fundamental and all-pervasive aspects:
the very meaning of the natural law, and
its epistemological basis.5
In his reply, however, Professor Goble
states ". . . the primary target of my criti-
cism was the natural law which developed
in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries
and was transported to the United States in
the 18th and 19th centuries. Dean Pound
called this the 'classical natural law.' " He
asks, "Who is to say what is the classical
natural law?", and asserts, "Father Kenealy
described another system called natural
law, and then took great pains to show that
my criticism had no application to it, and
further that since it did not, it is obvious
that I do not understand his system."'7
5 Kenealy, supra note 2.
6 Goble, supra note 3.
7 Goble, supra note 3, at 227.
Professor Goble has a good ad hominem
point here-but only if and insofar as his
arguments were aimed exclusively at his
"primary" target, the seventeenth-century
and eighteenth-century natural law, which
Dean Pound described and called classical.
But the Professor's arguments were not so
confined to his "primary" target. He dis-
charged a blunderbuss which scattered shot
at a more important and enduring target,
the traditional scholastic natural law, which
I termed classical. s This seems fairly clear
from the tenor of his original article, and
from the following statement in his reply:
Father Kenealy's system, as well as the
system described by Pound, encompasses
what are called "fundamental principles"
which are said to be "certain, immutable
and universal," and which are "antecedent,
both in logic and in nature, to the forma-
tion of civil societies." To the extent that
Father Kenealy's system incorporates this
view it seems to me to be vulnerable to
at least some of the criticisms set forth in
my article.9 (Italics added.)
Professor Goble expresses gratification at
my statement that his arguments have "con-
siderable relevance to the 'natural law'
theories of Pufendorf, Thomasius, Hobbes,
Spinoza and their followers of the seven-
8 I did so instinctively, I suppose, because of the
ancient and unbroken development and tradition
of the philosophia perennis from the ancient
Greeks and Romans through the medieval scho-
lastics to the modern neo-scholastics. This tradi-
tional school still seems to me more deserving of
the term "classical" than its seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century off-shoots which perpetrated
the various "state of nature" theories.
9 Goble, The Dilemma of the Natural Law,
2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 226, 228 (July 1956).
teenth and eighteenth centuries."' 0 Never-
theless, his reply reinforces my conviction
that he misses the meaning and the episte-
mology of the traditional scholastic natural
law.
I. The Meaning
1. Referring to the fundamental prin-
ciples of the natural law, which are certain,
universal and immutable, I had recited the
familiar doctrine that they "are generally
divided into a primary principle and its
immediate specifications, called secondary
principles. The primary principle is usually
phrased in such terms as 'What is good is
to be done, and what is evil is to be
avoided.' "" Commenting on this primary
principle, Professor Goble stated:
If we define "good" in general terms,
that is, without reference to particular acts,
we would have to say something like this,
"good is what one ought to do." But if we
do that, the principle becomes tautological,
i.e., "one ought to do what one ought to
do." This can hardly be said to be a
principle at all.' 2
But this is not the meaning of the pri-
mary principle. The misconception lies in
the confusion of "good" and "ought."
There are many morally good acts which
are not morally obligatory. There are works
of supererogation. Heroic acts of charity
are among the more conspicuous examples.
Surely, Professor Goble is not morally
obliged to perform all possible morally
good acts within his power of choice. The
10 Kenealy, Whose Natural Law?, 1 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 259, 261 (Oct. 1955).
" Id. at 262.
12 Goble, supra note 9, at 229.
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concept of "good" and the concept of
"obligation" must be sharply distinguished.
The former means suitability to being or
nature; the latter means necessity to end or
destiny. Generically, the morally good act
means a free act conformed to rational
nature, perfective of human nature ade-
quately considered (and therefore condu-
cive to that nature's end); the morally evil
act means a free act difformed from ra-
tional nature, degrading to human nature
adequately considered (and therefore re-
pulsive to that nature's end). By human
nature "adequately considered" is meant
the operative human being, considered in
the light of the internal harmony of his
faculties and the external harmony of his
relations to his Creator and his fellow
creatures. By the end of human nature is
meant the fulfillment or perfection of hu-
man being. By obligation is meant the
determination or moral necessity to that
end.
Therefore, while the primary principle
prohibits all evil acts, because they are nec-
essarily repugnant to the end, it does not
command all good acts, because, although
all are conducive, not all are necessary to
the end; but it does command all good acts
ontologically necessary to the attainment of
the end of man. The point is that "good"
and "ought" are neither identical in concept
nor coextensive in predication. The univer-
sality and immutability of the principle
emanates from the ontological universality
and immutability of human nature and the
ontological relation of human acts to hu-
man destiny. The certain knowledge of the
principle is an epistemological matter
which I shall attempt to discuss later. It
strikes me as extremely significant, how-
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ever, that Professor Goble's formulation
of the principle, by identifying the "good"
and the "ought," seems to indicate that
he accepts as obvious and evident (and,
logically, also as universal and immutable)
that "good ought to be done and evil
avoided." If he does not, what would the
reason be for doubt, exception or change?
2. In discussing the secondary princi-
ples of the natural law, I had said:
As immediate specifications of the primary
principle, the secondary principles find fa-
miliar expression in the (still general)
terms of the Decalogue. The secondary
principles share the certainty, universality
and immutability of the primary princi-
ple." .
To which Professor Goble replied:
Suppose we consider the Commandment
"Thou shalt not kill." Notwithstanding the
literally clear, unqualified and uncondi-
tional statement of this injunction, one may
justifiably kill another in self-defense, in
defense of his family, or even in defense
of a stranger. . . . These are generally rec-
ognized exceptions to the mandate "Thou
shalt not kill." But these exceptions are
in no sense "derived" from the rule, as
Father Kenealy seems to suggest. An ex-
ception which permits killing cannot be
"derived" from a rule which says the exact
opposite. 14
I do not wish to substitute adjective for
argument. But I am compelled to say that
this is a fantastic interpretation of a sec-
ondary principle of the natural law. It
13 Kenealy, supra note 10, at 262.
14 Goble, The Dilemma of the Natural Law,
2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 226, 230 (July 1956).
could not have been suggested by any
scholastic treatise or manual. It is based
upon a verbalism utterly alien to scholastic
thinking. It might make one wonder why
Professor Goble does not consider the
swatting of a mosquito or the plucking of a
bluebell as an "exception to the mandate."
The cited "exceptions" are not exceptions
at all to the scholastic principle. I had used
the expression, "the (still general) terms
of the Decalogue," advisedly. The four
monosyllables, "Thou shalt not kill,"
merely indicate the principle. The princi-
ple, in its negative aspect, prohibits the
immoral killing or infliction of bodily harm
upon self or other human beings. In its
positive aspect, it commands the preserva-
tion of life and bodily integrity of self and
other human beings. As a verbal formula-
tion of the negative aspect, I would sug-
gest "Thou shalt not kill or inflict bodily
harm upon any human being unjustly."
Wherefore, acts of self-defense, defense
of others, warfare, executions for crime,
corporal punishment, anesthesia, surgery,
vaccination, strenuous sports, and all other
bodily harms or risks of the same, which
are justifiable, are not exceptions to the
principle. They are outside its prohibi-
tions; in fact, they may be within its com-
mands. And the justification of the act will
depend upon the norm of morality, i.e.,
conformity with or difformity from human
nature adequately considered, and as spe-
cifically determined by the nature of the
act, the circumstances of the action, and
the motive of the actor. This is not to say
or suggest that the determination of such
moral problems is easy or automatic. I had
stated in my criticism of Professor Goble's
original article:
That natural law does not mean a closed
legal system, is evident from the fact that
the fundamental principles do not tell us
automatically in concrete applications what
is good or evil, just or unjust, wise or un-
wise; what is idolatry, murder, theft, adul-
tery, perjury or calumny.' 5
Hence, it is quite true that the solution
to a question of justifiable self-defense is
not "derived" or deduced a priori from the
principle which demands justification for
the slaying of another. The solution of
such problems is what gives rise to the sci-
ence of morality-just as the difficulty of
applying principles (and rules) of law
gives rise to the science of law. Surely it is
not true that a principle (or even a rule)
is meaningless or useless because its ap-
plication may be difficult in particular
cases. The phrase "due process" indicates
a legal principle (declaring and enforcing
a natural law principle) of great difficulty
in particular cases. But to me it is of great
meaning and moment that the moral law,
which says I may not be deprived of life
unjustly, is recognized and enforced by the
civil law, which says I may not be deprived
of life without due process-and this de-
spite the fact that, in close cases, men and
judges of reasonable but finite mentalities,
may differ about the application of justice
and due process. General principles may
not decide particular cases; but particular
cases cannot be decided without them.
A possible clue to Professor Goble's
misunderstanding of natural law principles
may lie in his use of the terms "principle"
and "rule" interchangeably. He argues that
15 Kenealy, Whose Natural Law?, 1 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 259, 262 (Oct. 1955).
17 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1971
principles of natural law cannot be uni-
versal or immutable, because rules of civil
law obviously are not."' The argument is
a non sequitur because the terms do not
mean the same thing. A principle of nat-
ural law can be known by man, because he
can know his own nature and essential re-
lations; but the principle cannot be made,
changed or destroyed by man, because he
cannot make, change or destroy his essen-
tial nature; wherefore a principle of the
natural law is universal and immutable as
the essential nature from which it ema-
nates. But a rule of civil law must be made,
and may be changed or abrogated by man's
legislative or judicial process; wherefore a
rule of the civil law lacks the universality
and immutability of a principle of the nat-
ural law. This is the reason why civil law
enactments and rulings should be con-
sonant with principles of natural law; it is
why the natural law constitutes a norm to
measure the justice or injustice of civil
law.
Professor Goble cites, among others, the
rule of consideration in the law of Con-
tracts; 17 I might add, to spread the field,
the rule of hearsay in Evidence, the rule of
witnesses in Wills, the rule of recording
in Property, the rule of strict liability in
Torts, the rule of "retreating to the wall"
in Crimes, the rule concerning self-incrim-
ination in Constitutional Law, and many
others, from the rules governing statutes of
limitations all the way down to traffic rules
and minor procedural regulations. As
rules, they have generality; but they are
also subject to exceptions properly so
16 Goble, supra note 14, at 228-236.
17 Goble, supra note 14, at 231.
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called; and they may require change, grad-
ual or drastic, as time and wisdom de-
mand. For they are practical and subsidi-
ary means, of more or less efficiency, to
enable government to apply the great prin-
ciples of the natural law to human beings
who live in the constantly changing politi-
cal, economic and social conditions of civil
society. s
3. A similar misunderstanding seems to
color Professor Goble's notion of the ab-
solute and inalienable rights involved in
the philosophy of the natural law. I had
stated in my article:
Natural law does indeed imply the exis-
tence of some human rights which are abso-
lute and inalienable, such as the right to life,
worship, marriage, property, labor, speech,
locomotion, assembly, reputation, etc. These
are absolute in the sense that they derive
from human nature; they are not mere
handouts from the state; the state is bound
to protect them and cannot destroy them
even though, by physical force, the state
has sometimes prevented their exercise.
They are not absolute in the sense that they
are unlimited in scope. It is a commonplace
in classical natural law philosophy that
human rights, even the most fundamental
mentioned above, are limited. They are
Is Cf. Fagan, The Goble-Kenealy Discussion-
Two Comments, 2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 324 (Oct.
1956). Professor Fagan seems to have missed the
context of my statement that some derivative
principles do not "share in the certainty, uni-
versality and immutability of the fundamental
principles." Taken sensu composito, some deriva-
tives plainly do not have the certainty quoad nos.
Moreover, I was refuting the notion that natural
law involved a "closed legal system," indicating
that many positive principles and practical rules,
constructed under the philosophy of the natural
law, would obviously not be certain, universal or
immutable.
limited in the sense that they are subject
to specification, qualification, expansion and
contraction, and even forfeiture of exercise,
as the equal rights of others and the de-
mands of the common good from circum-
stance to circumstance, and from time to
time, reasonably indicate. Human rights
are absolute only in the sense of the min-
imal requirements of a just and ordered
liberty. But this is not the stuff of a
closed system of immutably "attained per-
fection."' 9
To which Professor Goble replied:
It is simply linguistic gymnastics to say
in one breath that a principle is "certain,
universal and immutable" or that a right is
"absolute," and in the next that it is, never-
theless, subject to "qualification," "ex-
pansion," "contraction" or "forfeiture."
"Qualification" and "contraction" include
"exception," and an "exception" is an actual
subtraction from the rule. Each exception
reduces the scope of the rule by the amount
of the exception, and therefore makes it ap-
ply to fewer situations. By any reasonable
definition this is a change in the rule itself.
... It seems to me that Father Kenealy has
paid a terrific price in semantics to make it
possible to say that his fundamental prin-
ciples are "certain, universal and immut-
able." 20
This reply confuses not merely princi-
ples with rules, but both with rights. I
stated that the fundamental principles of
the natural law are certain, universal and
immutable; but I have never so described
rules or rights. A right is neither a princi-
ple nor a rule. Generically, a right is an
individual's moral power to act, to omit,
19 Kenealy, Whose Natural Law?, I CATHOLIC
LAWYER 259, 263-64 (Oct. 1955).
2( Goble, The Dilemma of the Natural Law,
2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 226, 231-32 (July 1956).
or to exact something of another. It is a
legal right when that power is granted, or
recognized as existing, by the civil law.
It is a natural right when that power ema-
nates from human nature itself, i.e., from
essential human personality and destiny.
Obviously, then, a right may be both nat-
ural and legal. Now, I said that natural
rights "are absolute in the sense that they
derive from human nature, they are not
mere hand-outs from the state"; and that
the state "cannot destroy them," because
the state is unable to destroy the nature
from which they emanate; and that the
state "is bound to protect them," because
it is for the purpose of securing these rights
that governments are instituted among
men. Nevertheless, I also said that natural
rights, which are absolute in the sense ex-
plained, are limited in scope, "in the sense
that they are subject to specification, quali-
fication, expansion and contraction, and
even forfeiture of exercise. . . ." To Profes-
sor Goble, this distinction is "simply lin-
guistic gymnastics."
They have blown the whistle on my ath-
letic days, but I do not think that the dis-
tinction requires particular agility, semantic
or otherwise. I shall attempt to illustrate
some typical limitations upon absolute nat-
ural rights. Life: may be forfeited by just
conviction of a capital crime, although
even then it would be retained as against
private necktie parties. Worship: may be
qualified by reasonable restrictions as to
time, place and circumstance, and hence I
may justly be prevented from celebrating
Mass when and where I would block the
necessary flow of traffic, e.g., in the middle
of Times Square. Marriage: may be speci-
fied and qualified by reasonable restrictions
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as to age and consanguinity, etc.; but not,
I believe, by so-called miscegenation stat-
utes, which seem to me repugnant to the
essence of the natural right. Property: may
be qualified, contracted or expanded by
reasonable zoning laws, anti-trust regula-
tions, wage and hour legislation, etc.
Labor: may be specified and qualified by
reasonable professional licensing require-
ments, sanitary regulations, wage and hour
and conditions-of-work legislation, etc.
Speech: may be qualified by reasonable
restrictions necessary, at least in time of
grave emergency or catastrophe, for the
common good. Locomotion: may be speci-
fied, contracted or expanded by reasonable
passport rules, imigration laws, etc.; and
I do not mean the "national quota system."
Assembly: may be qualified by reasonable
requirements in the interest of public
health, safety and order. Reputation: may
be qualified by reasonable laws requiring
testimony in public trials, disclosure of em-
barrassing but contagious diseases, etc.
These are simply random examples of
limitations upon the scope of the absolute
natural rights which I had enumerated; but
they are typical of the limited scope which
is an attribute of all natural rights.
Is this "linguistic gymnastics?" I think
not. If the scope of natural rights were sub-
ject to unreasonable or arbitrary limita-
tion, either by the fiat of a dictator or the
majority vote of a democracy, then indeed
they would be subject to simple extinction
and could not be said to be absolute. But
natural rights still exist in Budapest, no
matter how their exercise is frustrated by
civil law and brute force, because the Hun-
garians are still human beings. If, however,
the scope of natural rights is subject only
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to reasonable limitation for the sake of the
common good, then indeed they are not
subject to simple extinction and can prop-
erly be said to be absolute. Reasonable
limitation of scope is a "built-in" attribute
of natural and inalienable rights.
For the human person, in his essential
nature, is not merely an individual being,
he is also a social being living with his fel-
lows in an external society which is subject
to political, economic, technological and
social change. Hence, his natural rights
(and, of course, obligations) are both in-
dividual and social. To consider him solely
as an individual would lead to anarchy; to
consider him solely as a social unit would
lead to totalitarianism. But his individual-
social nature adequately considered leads
to the conclusion that his natural rights are
absolute, in the sense explained, because
he is an individual for whose good govern-
ments are instituted; and to the perfectly
compatible conclusion that his natural
rights are limited in scope, in the sense
explained, because he is also a social per-
son obliged by nature to contribute to the
common good.
4. I had asked Professor Goble: "What
representative natural law philosopher or
spokesman held the principle that 'by nat-
ural law, freedom of contract could not be
interfered with by legislation'?"'2 1 To which
he replied:
This is a loaded question, because if I
name such a person, all Father Kenealy
need do is to say that my selection is not
a "representative" natural-law philosopher,
and he will not be representative because
21 Kenealy, supra note 19, at 263.
he takes that view. There were certainly a
number of judges who claimed to be nat-
ural-law lawyers who held to the theory
of the inviolability of freedom of contract.
Justices Chase, Field, Miller and Brewer
may be mentioned as among those who at
various times took this view. These judges
were reprepresentatives of the natural law
of the nineteenth century, if not of the
natural law of Father Kenealy.22
I had also asked Professor Goble: "
[W]hat fundamental principle, what princi-
ple held to be certain, universal and im-
mutable has been relinquished at any time
by devotees of the classical natural law?" 23
To which he replied:
This question is also impossible to answer
to Father Kenealy's satisfaction, because
any person I might name as having relin-
quished a fundamental principle of natural
law would by such relinquishment disqual-
ify himself as a "devotee" of Father Ke-
nealy's classical natural law .... In relation
to this question I would like to propose the
name of Judge Robert N. Wilkin as one
who meets all of Father Kenealy's require-
ments for a classical natural-law lawyer. 24
From these two replies, it would seem
that Professor Goble is somewhat wary of
my cauda Jesuitica. Unnecessarily, I trust.
The two questions were rhetorical, I sup-
pose, but they were not "loaded." The
rhetoric expressed my conviction that no
recognized scholastic philosopher, or rep-
resentative spokesman for scholastic nat-
ural-law philosophy, has ever taken the
22 Goble, supra note 20, at 232.
23 Kenealy, Whose Natural Law?, I CATHOLIC
LAWYER 259, 262 (Oct. 1955).
24 Goble, The Dilemma of the Natural Law,
2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 226, 233 (July 1956).
positions indicated. But had Professor
Goble surprised me by naming a philoso-
pher or spokesman in point, I trust that I
would have the candor to admit it. I am
interested in the philosophy, which is quite
independent of the aberrations of any par-
ticular philosopher. We have sharpened
the focus of our controversy to the point
where the laissez-faire nineteenth-century
rugged individualism of Justices Chase,
Field, Miller and Brewer are not in issue.
There remains the case of Judge Wilkin
to consider.
Judge Wilkin is listed by Harold Reusch-
lein 25 as a neo-scholastic. He wrote the
opinion in Hayes v. Crutcher,26 which Pro-
fessor Goble describes as follows:
In 1952, Judge Wilkin wrote a judicial
opinion in which he stated that since it is
contrary to nature for black birds, white
birds, red birds and blue birds to roost on
the same limb of a tree, it is contrary to
natural law for colored persons to have a
right to the use of a public golf course
which by city ordinance was limited to
white persons. "It seems" said the judge,
"that segregation is not only recognized in
constitutional law and judicial decision, but
that it is also supported by general prin-
ciples of natural law."'27
Without consciously deviating from my
protestations of candor in controversy, and
despite Harold Reuschlein's listing, I do
not think that Judge Wilkin qualifies as a
scholastic philosopher or as a spokesman
for that philosophy. 28 However, for the
25 Cf. REUSCHLEIN, JURISPRUDENCE 391 (1951).
26 108 F. Supp. 582 (M.D. Tenn. 1952).
27 Goble, supra note 24.
28 That Dean Reuschlein agrees with Father
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sake of the point in issue, let us suppose
that he does. What follows? I still ask
"What fundamental principle, what prin-
ciple held to be certain, universal and im-
mutable has been relinquished" by Judge
Wilkin? Although he stated that, in his
opinion, segregation was "supported by
general principles of natural law," he was
obviously making a particular application
of the principles (which he did not name
or describe) to a concrete case. But I had
already said:
Natural-law philosophers agree on the
fundamental principles of the natural law;
they differ on its derivative principles and
standards; and there is wide divergence of
opinion as to the concrete applications of
its derivative principles and standards to
the constantly changing political, economic,
social and legal conditions of human soci-
ety. But what do such differences prove?
Surely not the invalidity of the funda-
mental philosophy. Such differences prove
that the area of opinion is larger than the
area of certainty .... 29
In fairness to Judge Wilkin, it should be
recalled that he wrote his opinion in 1952
as the judge of a lower federal court before
the Supreme Court overruled Plessy v.
Ferguson in the School Segregation Cases.
Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that his
dicta about birds attempted to link natural
law to segregation on golf courses. The
answer to Judge Wilkin seems to be that
men are not birds, and birds do not play
golf. It would be diverting, if somewhat
Kenealy is evident from his comment on Judge
Wilkin's opinion in the Hayes case. 2 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 234 (July 1956).
29 Kenealy, Whose Natural Law?, 1 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 259, 265 (Oct. 1955).
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startling, to imagine the logical conclusions
from a premise that men should act like
birds. It appears that the Judge's argument
about the instinctive actions of our feath-
ered friends has no relevance to the ra-
tional conduct of human beings at all, but
is strictly for the birds. My own opinion
about the application of natural law to the
issue of compulsory racial segregation is
expressed elsewhere in these pages.
30
II. The Epistemology
1. The epistemology 3t  of scholastic
philosophy constitutes another stumbling
block for Professor Goble. It is something
quite mysterious. I had made the follow-
ing statement:
I infer that Professor Goble believes that
the epistemological basis of natural law
philosophy is: the criterion of truth is sub-
jective certitude or sincerity of subjective
conviction. This is simply not true ...
On the contrary, natural law philosophers
unanimously set up objective evidence as
the criterion of truth. The philosophers of
various theories of subjectivism, Descartes,
Spinoza, Leibnitz, Berkeley, Hume and
their followers are again the express episte-
mological adversaries of classical natural
law.32
To which Professor Goble replied:
These positive assertions by Father
Kenealy that immutable and universal prin-
30 Kenealy, Segregation-A Challenge to the Le-
gal Profession, 3 CATHOLIC LAWYER 37 (Jan.
1957).
31 Epistemology is the science of the methods
and grounds of knowledge, especially with ref-
erence to its limits and validity.
32 Kenealy, supra note 29, at 264.
ciples of natural law are established by "ob-
jective evidence" are mystifying. I know
of no scientific means, or trial and error
procedures by which principles of law can
be determined to be immutable and uni-
versal. How can it be established by objec-
tive evidence that principles are good or
bad for society if we must accept them as
immutably created before there was any
society?33
I had stated that "natural rights and ob-
ligations are inalienable precisely because
they are God-given. They are antecedent,
both in logic and in nature, to the forma-
tion of civil societies. ' 34 Which drew this
response:
The proposition that certain legal prin-
ciples are "antecedent, both in logic and in
nature, to the formation of civil societies"
seems to assume that the mind can reason
without experience-that it can by deduc-
tive logic reach conclusions about how men
ought to conduct themselves in society, be-
fore society exists, and therefore before
there are facts upon which reasoning can be
based. Psychologists, I believe, would deny
this. The mind cannot create knowledge. It
cannot think in a vacuum.3 5
Analyzing the above two quotations, and
their cited contexts, it seems to me that
Professor Goble is committed, explicitly or
implicitly, to the five following proposi-
tions: (a) That the immediate evidence, of
the fundamental principles of the natural
law, assumes "that the mind can reason
without experience." (b) That the anteced-
33 Goble, The Dilemma of the Natural Law,
2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 226, 228 (July 1956).
.34 Kenealy, Whose Natural Law?, 1 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 259, 260 (Oct. 1955).
35 Goble, supra note 33, at 229.
ence "in logic and in nature," of inalien-
able rights to the formation of civil so-
cities, necessarily means antecedence in
time "before society exists." (c) That the
only evidence constituting the criterion of
truth is that specific to the "scientific
means, or trial and error procedures" of
the positive and physical sciences. (d) That
such procedures are competent to deter-
mine whether or not the fundamental
principles of the natural law-command-
ing good and prohibiting evil, forbidding
unjust killings and the like-are, as prin-
ciples, "good or bad for society." (e) That
such procedures are competent to test the
validity of the ultimate and necessary
metaphysical premises of the positive and
physical sciences themselves. I shall at-
tempt to indicate why I think these five
propositions are erroneous.
(a) It is a fundamental axiom of scho-
lastic epistemology that "nihil est in intel-
lectu nisi prius aliquo modo in sensu,"
that is, nothing can exist in the mind which
has not been previously in some manner
in the senses. Wherefore, a man who has
never seen cannot conceive a proper idea
of color; a man who has never heard can-
not conceive a proper idea of sound; and
a man who had never experienced any
sensation, internal or external, could not
have any intellectual idea at all. It is cer-
tainly true that the mind cannot "create
knowledge" or "think in a vacuum."
Nevertheless, the senses supply only
particular and material data, whereas the
intellect can abstract from such data ideas
which are universal and spiritual, e.g., the
idea of being, nature, end, relation, act,
potency, good, evil, right, obligation, prin-
ciple, controversy, premise, argument, con-
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clusion, etc. Such universal ideas do not
exist, as universals, independently of an act
of the intellect; but they have a foundation
in objective reality, because they represent
reality as abstracted from particular ob-
jects which do exist independently of an
act of the intellect. But the intellect can do
much more than apprehend ideas, it can
also reflect, compare, reason, and form
judgments; judgments do not exist, as
judgments, independently of an act of the
intellect; but, because they are predica-
tions of objective reality, they will be true
or false insofar as they do or do not con-
form to the reality of the object existing
independently of the act of judging. Hence,
the criterion of truth (and the motive of
certitude) can only be objective evidence,
which may be defined as the manifestation,
to the judging intellect, of the ontological
necessity of the object to be what it is.
Accordingly, as the ontological necessity
of the object is metaphysical, physical or
moral, the truth (and certitude) of the
judgment will be metaphysical, physical,
or moral. Moreover, as the manifestation
of that necessity does or does not depend
upon some previously known truth, the
objective evidence involved will be medi-
ate or immediate. For knowledge must be-
gin somewhere. And all knowledge, both
speculative and practical, must depend
upon some immediately evident truths.
Otherwise we could never know anything,
even probabilities. But we certainly do
know some things.
The scholastic doctrine, therefore, that
the fundamental principles of the natural
law are objectively and immediately evi-
dent, does not "assume that the mind can
reason without experience." It does not as-
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sert that such principles are the first truths
known by men. It merely recognizes that
such principles constitute the basis upon
which all truths of the practical moral or-
der ultimately depend.
(b) Antecedence "in logic and in na-
ture" does not necessarily mean anteced-
ence in time "before society exists." An-
tecedence means priority: in logic, priority
of premise to conclusion; in nature, pri-
ority of cause to effect; in time, priority by
the calender or clock. Inalienable natural
rights are antecedent in logic to society,
because we argue from what man's nature
is to what society should be; we do not
argue from what society is to what man's
nature should be. Inalienable natural
rights are antecedent in nature to society,
because man's nature and natural activities
are the cause of society, sc., material, for-
mal, efficient and final; man makes society,
society does not make man. It is "to secure
these rights" that "governments are insti-
tuted among men;" the Hungarians appre-
ciate this. As to time, whether man ever
existed in a "state of nature," as the seven-
teenth and eighteenth century philosophers
seem to have held, i.e., "before society"
existed, is disputed by most scientists; but
is completely immaterial to scholastic doc-
trine and to my argument.
(c) Nor is the evidence specific to the
"scientific means, or trial and error pro-
cedures" of the positive and physical sci-
ences the only evidence constituting the
criterion of truth. Such procedures, and
their specific evidence, have reference to
the formal objects of such sciences, sc.,
what is in the positive and physical order.
But we also know some things about the
normative and metaphysical orders; we
know something about truth itself, about
freedom, faith, hope, love, prudence, jus-
tice, temperance, fortitude, sacrifice, pa-
triotism-which are not the least compo-
nents of the "good life" of men and their
societies. They are also the objects of
knowledge and, therefore, have their own
objective evidence.
(d) Nor are such procedures competent
to determine whether or not the funda-
mental principles of the natural law-com-
manding good and prohibiting evil, forbid-
ding unjust killings and the like-are, as
principles, good or bad for society; because
the positive and physical sciences are not
normative. They study the "is" and not the
"ought;" they prescind from "values."
They bring to light extremely important
positive and physical data which, however,
must be evaluated by the normative and
metaphysical sciences.
(e) Nor are such procedures competent
to test the validity of the ultimate and nec-
essary metaphysical premises of the positive
and physical sciences themselves. Among
such premises are: the principle of contra-
diction, that a thing cannot be and not be
at the same time under the same aspect;
the principle of sufficient reason, that what-
ever exists must have a sufficient reason
for its existence; the principle of causality,
that whatever exists contingently, or begins
to be, must have a cause of its existence;
the existence of objective reality indepen-
dent of the human intellect; the capacity of
the intellect to know some reality; the dif-
ference between truth and error, between
certitude and probability, etc. These are
metaphysical truths necessarily presup-
posed by the positive and physical sciences
for the validation of their own procedures
and conclusions; they are above and be-
yond the self-imposed formal objects of
such sciences. Moreover, such premises
cannot be "proved," in the sense of pro-
ceeding from the known to the unknown,
because they are immediately evident; be-
cause the very attempt to "prove" them
supposes their truth-just as Professor
Goble cannot "prove" to himself that he
exists, because any effort to do so would
suppose his existence. Nevertheless, such
metaphysical premises are the starting
points of all human knowledge. Every for-
ward march of science presupposes them,
and none can "prove," disprove or change
them. For, when properly understood, they
are objectively and immediately evident as
certain, universal and immutable truths.
The metaphysical truths indicated above
are among the first principles of the specu-
lative order; the fundamental principles of
the natural law are the first principles of
the practical order. This distinction is one
of convenience made because the same in-
tellect can know and reason about es-
sences, causes and effects, the "is" of
necessary being, i.e., truths which are posi-
tive or speculative; and it can also know
and reason about conduct, means to ends,
the "ought" of physically free human ac-
tions, i.e., truths which are normative or
practical. The primary principle of the nat-
ural law is the basic truth of the practical
moral order, which is supposed by all other
truths of the same order, and upon which
their validity depends. It is not known
"without experience," nor is it the first
truth known by the intellect. For the intel-
lect, considering man's rational nature, his
capacity for action, the conformity ("good-
ness") of some acts to that nature, the dif-
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formity ("badness") of other acts from
that nature, the fulfillment or perfection
which is the end of that nature, the neces-
sity of attaining that end, the possibility of
frustrating the end, the relation of attain-
ment between good acts and the end, the
relation of frustration between bad acts
and the end, and the fact of the physical
freedom of man in action--considering
such things, the intellect cannot help but
see that man, although physically free, is
nevertheless morally obliged ("ought") to
do good and avoid evil.
The above sentence, of course, is not an
attempt to "prove" the primary principle.
Any such attempt, in the sense of moving
from the known to the unknown "ought,"
would be impossible; because it would
necessarily presuppose some logically
prior "ought;" but no logically prior
"ought" can be adduced, because there is
none. The positive and physical sciences
obviously cannot adduce one, since they
are concerned exclusively with the "is;"
and no one can get an "ought" in front of
a microscope or a telescope. All men ac-
cept the primary principle; none deny it. I
am sure that Professor Goble does not. For
all men, no matter how violently they may
differ upon its application to particular
acts or concrete fact situations, agree upon
the basic truth that good should be done
and evil avoided. Its denial would make
futile any discussion of the moral order, of
good and evil, justice and injustice, rights
and obligations, due process and equal
protection, etc. Its denial, in fact, has been
incorporated into the insanity tests of civil-
ized criminal codes. And this is because
the primary principle, again when properly
understood, is objectively and immediately
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evident as a certain, universal and im-
mutable truth.
2. These qualities of the primary prin-
ciple of the natural law are equally attribu-
table to its immediate specifications, the
secondary principles, e.g., that one should
not unjustly kill another. Professor Goble,
however, asks:
Assuming that a principle has always
been good and always will be good, how
can that fact be proved presently by "ob-
jective evidence"? The only basis for a
belief in the validity of a principle before
or after the date of its verification by evi-
dence is probability. . . . To the extent
that we project a principle forward or
backward beyond this point of time, we
rely solely on faith, but not on objective
evidence .... Science limits itself to stating
its laws as probabilities or plausibilities,
and not as absolutes, universals or immu-
tables.36 (Italics supplied.)
Sincerely desiring not to be captious, it
is my turn to find Professor Goble's termi-
nology "mystifying." In the quotation
above, the "basis" for assent to a principle
is variously referred to as "evidence,"
"probability" and "faith." Faith I shall
deal with later; evidence is obviously the
basis for assent; but probability is never
the basis for assent. Probalility and certi-
tude are both qualities of assent, which are
determined by the quality of the evidence
upon which the assent is based. Moreover,
although the possession and use of truth is
"good," it seems confusing to refer to prin-
ciples as "good" or bad, rather than as true
or false. Because "goodness," as the object
36 Goble, The Dilemma of the Natural Law,
2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 226, 228-29 (July 1956).
of the will, is a quality of actions, whereas
"truth," as the object of the intellect, is a
quality of judgments; and principles are
judgments. Hence, if I am asked how a
perennially true principle can be proved
presently by objective evidence, I must
reply: If it is a fundamental principle,
either in the speculative or in the practical
order, it can never be "proved" or "dis-
proved" in the past, present or future; it
can be seen, however, at any time, in the
light of its own immediate objective evi-
dence. If it is a non-fundamental principle,
it can be proved provided there is sufficient
light from mediate objective evidence, and
the method of proof will be deductive, in-
ductive, or a combination of both. And be-
cause truth is objective and our minds are
finite, there are many truths which we do
not now, and never will, in this life at least,
know or prove. But, because truth is ob-
jective, whatever we do or will know will
be known by objective evidence.
The context of the above quotation
stresses the fact that the "science" of Pro-
fessor Goble is positive science to the ex-
clusion of normative science. Hence, ignor-
ing the latter which deals with the moral
order, he argues from the former which, by
the self-denial of its formal object, has
nothing to do with the subject matter of
the present controversy.
3. Nevertheless, Professor Goble's ref-
erences to "faith" as the "basis" of assent
to a principle is intriguing. He repeats the
idea as follows:
My argument is based on the premise
that the qualities of "universality" and
"immutability" of rules cannot be proved
by objective evidence. The existence of
these properties can be based only upot
faith.37 (Italics supplied.)
Assuming that he does not mean Divine
Faith, which would be irrelevant to this
philosophical controversy, I am puzzled as
to what he does mean. To me, faith means
assent to a proposition, not because of the
intrinsic objective evidence of the proposi-
tion itself, but because of the extrinsic au-
thority of the witness to the proposition.
But faith itself supposes objective evidence
of the existence, the competency, the ve-
racity, and the testimony of the witness;
and upon the objective evidence of these
four things will depend the quality of the
assent to the testified proposition. There-
fore objective evidence is always the ulti-
mate criterion of truth and the ultimate
motive of certitude. Natural law principles
are not offered on the authority of any-
body. They stand or fall on their own in-
trinsic and objective evidence. Professor
Goble's recurrence to "faith" seems to stem
from his desire to uphold principles which
cannot be proved from positive science.
That they cannot be "proved" from positive
science, I agree. But I cannot agree that
there is no objective evidence outside of
positive science. I would have to take that
proposition on "faith" from Professor
Goble. But I cannot, because it is im-
mediately and objectively evident that, de-
spite what I positively do, I "should" do
good and avoid evil. If Professor Goble
does not "know" this, but only "believes"
it, on whose authority does he believe it,
and why does he accept that authority?
4. Professor Goble states that principles
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of natural law, rules of positive science, and
apparently all judgments, are "subjective"
and have "no existence except in the
mind":
Basic to much that has been advanced
in this discussion is the view that a rule has
no objective existence in any other form
than as a group of spoken or written words,
that is, as a symbol. The idea or judgment
which the words symbolize is the important
thing, and it has no existence except in the
mind. The rule is therefore subjective and
not objective. . . . Of course, conduct
which results from knowledge of the rule is
objective, but conduct in compliance with a
rule, can hardly be said to be the rule
itself.38 (Italics supplied.)
With the statement that judgments are
more important than the words which sym-
bolize them, I agree; and I regret that Pro-
fessor Goble gave such importance to the
four symbols, "Thou shalt not kill," that he
missed the meaning of the principle which
they symbolize. Accordingly, despite the
symbols used above, I do not think that
Professor Goble is a philosophical subjec-
tivist. He agrees with the scholastic position
that objective reality exists independently of
an act of the mind, that the mind "cannot
create knowledge," that the mind "cannot
think in a vacuum," that the mind cannot
"reason without experience," and that the
positive sciences, at least, depend upon
"objective evidence." Why, then, does he
say that judgments are "subjective" and
have "no existence except in the mind"?
Judgments are acts of the intellect purport-
ing to represent objective reality. Precisely
as vital acts of the intellect, they are all, of
38 Goble, supra note 36, at 234.37 Goble, supra note 36, at 232.
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course, subjective. But from the standpoint
of human knowledge and all sciences they
have a much more important aspect: they
are purported representations of reality
outside the act and independent of it. False
judgments (men are birds), chimerical
ideas (square circles), figments of the
imagination (winged horses) and the like,
do not represent objective reality existing
independently of the act which elicits them;
they are purely subjective, therefore, both
as acts and as representations. But true
judgments (men are not birds, they are
rational animals) do represent objective
reality existing independently of the act
which elicits them. Hence, as representa-
tions, they are reasonably, and more ap-
propriately, called "objective." Similarly,
the reality which objective judgments repre-
sent is reasonably and appropriately called
"objective truth." It is essential to have a
criterion of truth and error; it is appro-
priate to have significant terminology to
separate the two. And "objective evidence,"
"objective truth," "objective judgments"
square with the ordinary uses of language,
e.g., "Pay no attention, it is just in his
mind."
5. Professor Goble seems to believe that
adherence to the fundamental principles of
the natural law would hobble the pursuit of
truth and handicap the search for a better
society and a more efficient administration
of justice. He asserts:
It appears that Father Kenealy believes
that fundamental principles should not yield
to man's broader knowledge or deeper in-
sights, because he is sure that the funda-
mental principles man now has are "cer-
tain, universal and immutable" and there-
fore perfect, and incapable of improvement.
This proposition I find myself unable to
accept. . . It is my belief that in the
search for truth the mind should not be
shackled by unverifiable rules.39
It is quite correct and logical to say that
the scholastic position is that "man's
broader knowledge or deeper insights" will
never prove that men should do evil and
avoid good, or kill one another unjustly,
or be indifferent to either; just as the same
broader knowledge or deeper insights will
never prove that things can be and not be
at the same time under the same aspect,
that things can exist without a sufficient
reason, that contingent things can exist
without a cause, that objective reality does
not exist independently of an act of the
human intellect, that the mind can know
nothing, that there is no difference between
truth and error, between certitude and
probability, etc. Far from shackling the
mind in its pursuit of truth, these are the
immediately and objectively evident prem-
ises indispensable to the pursuit of truth
and the advance of human knowledge.
But they do not dispense with the neces-
sity for the pursuit or the hope of the
advance. Therefore I had said:
The construction and maintenance of a
corpus juris adequately implementing the
natural law is a monumental and perpetual
task demanding the constant devotion of
the best brains and the most mature schol-
arship of the legal profession. For the
fundamental principles of the natural law,
universal and immutable as the human na-
ture from which they derive, require ra-
tional application to the constantly changing
political, economic and social conditions
of civil society. The application of the na-
tural law postulates change as the circum-
39 Goble, supra note 36, at 235, 236.
stances of human existence change. It re-
pudiates a naive and smug complacency
in the status quo. It demands a reasoned
acceptance of the good, and a rejection of
the bad, in all that is new. It commands a
critical search for the better. It requires
an exhaustive scrutiny of all the available
data of history, politics, economics, sociol-
ogy, psychology, philosophy, and every
other pertinent font of human knowledge.
Of primary importance, it insists that the
search for a better corpus juris be made in
the light of the origin, nature, dignity and
destiny of man; and in the knowledge of
the origin, nature, purpose and limitations
of the state.
40
40 Kenealy, Whose Natural Law?, 1 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 259, 260 (July 1956).
17 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1971
This is a blueprint for pursuit, not a
shackle to search. Moreover it is a libera-
tion of the ethical and legal mind from the
limited confinement of purely positive sci-
ence. Hence, the distinction and reply
which I made in the beginning of this essay
to Professor Goble's dilemma.
In conclusion I am happy to record my
appreciation of the cordial spirit and schol-
arly manner in which Professor Goble has
responded to my criticism of his original
article. We both seek the truth. And we
seek it with the disadvantage of discordant
terminology. But we seek it also with the
important advantage of mutual respect and
friendship.
